20 Years of Missed Warnings Part 1

How To—and How Not to—Fight Wildfires

Clearing skies at last! Rain, glorious rain! We can breathe again…

Introduction

By now you’ll have heard the news that the wildfire crisis in the Slocan Valley has eased thanks to a combination of cooler weather and several heavy rainfalls. The evacuation orders are all rescinded and residents have finally been able to go home, with Red Mountain residents away the longest and Slocan City the shortest. Highway 6 is fully open again after what was the longest shutdown of that road in its recent history. I haven’t had the heart to see it yet, but friends that have since driven the road tell me the devastation at the Silverton Lookout is shocking where the fire crossed the highway. The lookout is a popular destination for visitors and residents alike, providing unparalleled views of Slocan Lake both north and south. For the time being, and safety reasons, it remains closed to the public.

Many residents I talk to are still in a state of shock and trauma, grateful the end is in sight but numbed by weeks of constant stress. With the air quality index in New Denver reaching an unprecedented 500-plus during the worst of the Valhalla Park fires, my lungs are still recovering. I’ve developed a persistent cough. When my own nerves started to snap, I had to take a weekend with a companion to hike the Kaslo River Trail and just pick apples from the trees I work so hard to maintain. Two whole days without internet or email! Practically a miracle in this media-saturated age. And a reminder that our healing in this technological age still comes from the same place it always did—Nature. But I promised my readers an investigative report and here it is, in two parts.

There’s talk amongst Slocan Valley residents of pushing for an official inquiry into the handling of this year’s wildfires. Having spent countless hours reading reports dating back to the 2003 Gary Filmon “Firestorm” report commissioned by the BC government, BC Auditor General Wayne Strelioff’s 2005 analysis of the government uptake of that report, the 2017 Tsilhqot’in Nations “The Fires Awakened Us” report, and the 2023 Jim Cooperman report, “BC Wildfire Service ‘Uncontrolled’ Burn Causes Shuswap Firestorm 2,” I can testify that there’s not been any shortage of recommendations. (These reports are all freely available online so I’ll let you type their names into a search engine if you’re interested.)

So while I welcome any opportunity to hold a government to account, I’m skeptical of the effectiveness of any official inquiry. Too often, they’re political make-work projects, a boon for politicians because they give the appearance of doing something even if little follow-up actually occurs. We may need to emulate the National Citizens’ Inquiry (NCI) on Covid-19 convened by lawyer Shawn Buckley, which recorded testimony from hundreds of witnesses. Unfortunately, it suffered a total media blackout by mainstream news outlets. But at least it amends the historical record.

As it happens, last year’s wildfire crisis in the Shuswap led to the commissioning of the Premier David Eby’s Task Force on Emergencies. The release of its report in April this year was something of a record-speed result for a bureaucratic inquiry, with a series of recommendations aimed at improving wildfire response. (See downloadable PDF of report here.) [1] As mentioned, it has precedents in similar reports dating back to the 2003 Filmon Firestorm report, though the Premier’s Task Force report is much more concise. My investigative article below analyzes the report, providing deep historical context based on the other reports noted above. Jim Cooperman also provided a good critique of the current report on his website. [2] I must apologize for being “late to the party” on this report but there was very little promotion of it in the media. And there’s nothing like a crisis to motivate a person.

I should note here as a follow-up to my earlier article, “Why the New Super Fires?” in which I discussed the role of herbicide spraying for “invasive species” in BC forests, that Adrienne Richards has released an excellent article on the topic at her Westward Independent site. “Earlier this year, mass spraying of chemicals in our regional forests began, licensed to continue until April 2029.” Note the extent of the herbicide program: “The areas affected include Southern and Coastal British Columbia and Northern Coast Haida Gwaii, covering regional districts such as Alberni-Clayoquot, Capital, Cowichan, Cariboo, Central Coast, Central Kootenay, Central Okanagan, and more.” As both myself and Richards have noted, this can only make tinder-dry conditions in our forests ten times worse. [3]

Why spend so much time parsing decades-old reports? I do so in the quite possibly vain hope that humans can actually learn from their past. I leave you with one familiar Shakespearian quotation from The Tempest (appropriately): “What’s past is prologue.” And yes!—there are many positive developments in the new Premier’s Task Force report. However, there are still many missteps that desperately need correcting. In that context, novelist William Faulkner was right: “The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.” 

1) Virtual Reality Tools

The Premier’s Task Force leads by advocating for “new modeling tools and platforms, augmented by artificial intelligence… to improve the predictive intelligence emergency managers rely on…” But so far, the effectiveness of virtual reality tools is not supported by actual performance. A recently published UBC study in the journal Fire Ecology found “poor correspondence” and “no suitable match” between field observations and government data, specifically BC’s vegetation resource index and the national fire behaviour prediction system. [4] “We consistently found poor correspondence between field assessment data and both provincial and national fuel types. Mismatches were particularly frequent for (i) dry interior ecosystems, (ii) mixed wood and deciduous fuel types, and (iii) post-harvesting conditions.” [5]

Further, as BC Wildfire Service staff admitted at the July 21 public meeting in New Denver, the predictive wildfire modelling software they rely on assumes a constant rate of wind speed, something that doesn’t happen in nature. (Starting to get a sense of déjà vu yet? As in the software modelling of pandemic deaths that proved wrong by orders of magnitude?)

Luckily, the BC government isn’t quite prepared to fully abandon reality yet. The Premier’s report adds that, “in addition to future-focused predictive information, shared access to real-time intelligence is critical to enable faster and better-informed decisions and coordination among emergency management partners.” Real-time intelligence used to mean the provincial network of fire lookouts staffed by humans throughout fire season. Cooperman is calling for a return to the fire warden system, which provided rapid response capacity in every BC community, as we heard from one of our former fire wardens at the July 21^st New Denver information session with BCWS and the RDCK.

2) Early Attack Strategy

Another criticism levelled at the BC government by the Filmon Firestorm report was the lack of an early attack strategy on wildfires. “Veterans said it was always accepted that the most effective time for fighting the fires was between dawn and 10:00 am, before the heat of the day and the midday winds become a serious impediment to controlling the spread of the blaze. We were informed by Ministry of Forests (MoF) personnel that crews were held back for safety concerns.” [6] Slocan Valley residents this year heard similar safety reasons for late deployment of ground crews. In some cases crews did not arrive until days after a new fire was reported. In a letter to me from Forests Minister Bruce Ralston, he confirmed:

“The safety of our crews and the public is our top priority. …WorkSafe BC has requirements for hazard briefings to occur before entering a worksite each time that new hazards may be present. As wildfires are dynamic and may change overnight, as well as new crews arriving sometimes daily, frequent hazard briefings must occur. These usually occur between 6:30 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. before wildfire crews begin suppression efforts.” —BC Forests Minister Bruce Ralston [7]

The Premier’s Task Force report affirms the principle that “initial response to newly detected fires remains a critical element of effective wildfire management, especially when weather and fuel conditions pose an elevated risk of extreme fire behaviour and growth,” urging “initial response for newly detected fires based on a ‘nearest qualified crew’ principle.” Given local observations, residents may be surprised to learn from the MoF’s Forrest Tower that “BCWS has an aggressive initial attack strategy that over the season averages a 90-percent-plus success rate at bringing fires under control at less than a hectare within 24 hrs.” [8] This was certainly true in the case of the Wilson Creek fire near New Denver, where two helicopters worked in tandem with water buckets, bringing it under control in about 48 hours.

But Slocan Valley residents report other fires that were not actioned for days, allowing them to blow up out of control. We were told at public information meetings that aircraft cannot work at night, despite the military’s well-known use of night vision goggles, used in fighting California wildfires. We had local reports of ground crews starting late and knocking off for the day at 8 p.m. Yet in Minister Ralston’s letter, he insists: “BCWS often engages in 24/7 wildfire suppression efforts and will have crews working at all times of day and night. Heavy equipment operations often start at 3 a.m. to 4 a.m., or occur overnight, as equipment can work closer to the fire during overnight conditions when fire activity is diminished. Initial attack remains the priority for BCWS.” [9] So which is it? Once again we seem to be in the realm of government gaslighting.

3) Deployment of Community & Indigenous Firefighting Skills

A major criticism of firefighting policy in BC has been the unwillingness of government to include community members with firefighting experience, citing safety concerns and professional certification standards. Yet 21 years ago the Filmon Firestorm report urged the government to consider “some mechanism that allows past experience in the forest industry or firefighting to be recognized as equivalent certification, as a means of ensuring adequate local resources are available in times of extreme need.” [10] Filmon also recommended more involvement of Indigenous firefighting expertise:

“Many members of First Nations communities were willing and qualified to assist provincial firefighters with their own equipment, but claim they were not approached to do so. The Review Team recommends that the Ministry of Forests should explore ways to enhance the participation of First Nations in forest fire fighting and fuel load reduction activities.” —Hon. Gary Filmon [11]

The recently launched Cooperative Community Wildfire Response program, officially initiated in 2022, attempts to remedy this problem. In part, this is a response to the Tsilhqot’in nations report on the 2017 Chilcotin fires, “The Fires Awakened Us,” which criticized the continued sidelining of First Nations firefighters during that crisis: [12] “…due to the fact that the Tsilhqot’in Nation was not sufficiently funded for emergency preparedness, they were disadvantaged by the lack of dedicated resources for continual planning, training and testing. The magnitude of the situation forced the communities to respond to the emergency even without adequate resources. The conflict over jurisdiction caused numerous stumbles, which left communities, land and resources vulnerable to the impending wildfires within the territories of the Tsilhqot’in.” [13] Another motivation stated by the Province is its political commitment to meeting reconciliation goals set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

But will non-Indigenous civilian firefighters be left out of the Cooperative Community Wildfire Response program? According to MoF spokesperson Forrest Tower, the new program is “not specific to either Indigenous or non-Indigenous people. The BC Wildfire Service, and the Wildfire Management Branch before it, regularly hires local people as emergency firefighters when there is demonstrated skill and experience to help suppress wildfires.” [14] This was demonstrated in Argenta when the Argenta Safety and Preparedness Society (ASAP), a fully trained community fire department, assisted BCWS firefighting crews. By contrast, when New Denver/Silverton residents stood up at that first public meeting to say, “I want to help fight the fires. Where do I sign up?” they were dissuaded by a senior BCWS official citing a long list of certificates required before any civilian is allowed on a fire line.

Silverton Mayor Tanya Gordon said she has looked into the Cooperative Community Wildfire Response program and isn’t impressed. To be hired you must have completed two training programs at your own expense, pay for your own equipment, and the wage is $20 an hour—basically minimum wage. The BC government information sheet, “Community Response Frequently Asked Questions” provides the list of personal equipment required. Contrast this again with the Filmon report recommendation: “The Review Team was struck by the fact that these volunteers not only give willingly and generously of their time and effort without compensation, but are expected to pay for the courses they take to upgrade their skills and knowledge as structural firefighters. We believe it is in the interest of municipal and regional governments to pay for the training of volunteer firefighters…” [15]

The Ponderosa “planned ignition.”

4) Planned Ignitions, a.k.a. “Back Burns”

One local concern not addressed in the Premier’s Task Force report is the increasing use of “planned ignitions” or “back burns” to fight fires. A back burn in the Shuswap last year got out of control when the wind shifted direction, yet BCWS claimed it as a success. “Most North Shuswap residents struggle to comprehend how the BC Wildfire Service can claim their controlled ignition was a success that “saved hundreds of homes” when it is blatantly obvious to them that this backburn was responsible for destroying 176 houses, cabins and structures and damaging 50 more,” wrote Shuswap resident Jim Cooperman. [16] He has filed a complaint with the Forest Practices Board about the incident, with the investigation still ongoing. During that crisis, BCWS spokesperson Cliff Chapman called back burns “a primary tool in our firefighting toolkit,” doubling down on the “success” of the Shuswap back burn. [17] Whereas with the former BC Forest Service this technique was used only on a limited scale, a tactic of last resort.

At the Silverton public meeting, BCWS Incident Commander Mark Healey told residents the planned Ponderosa back burn would be 12 km. long. When I told my father this, he just laughed incredulously. Seldom would a back burn of that size have been used during his tenure with BC Forest Service. In Minister Ralston’s letter, he claims: “As the use of drip torches in British Columbia stretch back to the beginning of the BC Forest Service in 1912, it is possible that your father’s terminology is different from the current term ‘planned ignition.’” [18] The minister then supplies a link to a BCWS video site explaining how—but not really why—the technique is so heavily used now. Fortunately the Ponderosa back burn was contained. However, residents insist the Mulvey Creek fire was vastly increased by the back burn there. MoF spokesperson Tower defends the tactic, asserting it as “one of the safest and efficient means of bringing a fire under control and so that practice will continue to be used where appropriate.” [19]

Another reason for local concern regarding the extensive use of back burns in the valley is the potential impact on water systems. Many are concerned by the impact to gravity-fed, stream-sourced rural water systems, since post-fire ecology is known to be heavy in Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) and silt deposits. According to the website for Alberta Water, “A study published in 2006 compiled data from post-fire surface water monitoring programs where fire retardant constituted ammonia, phosphorus, and cyanide was measured... This study found these chemicals were also found in similar concentrations to streams in burned areas where retardant was not used.” [20] Slocan Valley residents have also suffered impacts to their water systems through silt runoff from clearcut logging. Similarly, the reduction in forest cover by wildfire can contribute to mudslides and floods.

NEXT: 20 Years of Missed Warnings Part 2

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[1] https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/public-safety-and-emergency-services/emergency-preparedness-response-recovery/embc/reports/premiers_task_force_on_emergencies_report-april2024.pdf

[2] Jim Cooperman, “Premier’s Task Force on Emergencies: Comments on Their Recommendations,” Shuswap Passion: https://shuswappassion.ca/shuswap/premiers-task-force-on-emergencies-comments-on-their-recommendations/

[3] Adrienne Richards, “Spraying and Fires in BC,” Westward Independent, August 14, 2024: https://wwind.ca/spraying-and-fires-in-bc/

[4] Brenna Owen, “Inaccurate government data may be stoking wildfires: UBC study,” March 3, 2024: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/inaccurate-data-forest-fuels-may-stoke-bc-wildfires-study-1.7132509

[5] “Fuel types misrepresent forest structure and composition in interior British Columbia: a way forward,” Jennifer N. Baron, Paul F. Hessburg, Marc-André Parisien, Gregory A. Greene, Sarah E. Gergel & Lori D. Daniels, Fire Ecology: https://fireecology.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s42408-024-00249-z

[6] Hon. Gary Filmon, “Firestorm 2003: A Provincial Review,” p. 58.  

[7] Letter to Sean Arthur Joyce from the Office of Forests Minister Bruce Ralston, August 19, 2024.

[8] Email to author from Forrest Tower dated August 15, 2024.  

[9] Letter to Sean Arthur Joyce from the Office of Forests Minister Bruce Ralston, August 19, 2024.

[10] Hon. Gary Filmon, “Firestorm 2003: A Provincial Review,” p. 8.  

[11] Hon. Gary Filmon, “Firestorm 2003: A Provincial Review,” pp. 56, 61.  

[12] Tsilhquot’in National Government, “The Fires Awakened Us”: https://tsilhqotin.ca/publications/the-fires-awakened-us-wildfire-report/  

[13] “Hazard Protection Measures in the Tsilhqot’in,” The Fires Awakened Us, p. 10.

[14] Email to author from Forrest Tower dated August 15, 2024.  

[15] Hon. Gary Filmon, “Firestorm 2003: A Provincial Review,” pp. 58, 59.  

[16] Jim Cooperman, “BC Wildfire Service ‘Uncontrolled’ Burn Causes Shuswap Firestorm 2023: The Story and the Evidence,” p. 1: https://shuswappassion.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Firestorm_2023_SE_small_singlepages.pdf

[17] “BC Wildfire Service Defends Planned Ignition in North Shuswap,” Global News video report, August 21, 2023: https://globalnews.ca/video/9910901/b-c-wildfire-service-defends-planned-ignition-in-north-shuswap

[18] Letter to Sean Arthur Joyce from the Office of Forests Minister Bruce Ralston, August 19, 2024.

[19] Email to author from Forrest Tower, August 15, 2024.  

[20] “How Wildfires Impact a Watershed,” Alberta Water: https://albertawater.com/how-wildfires-impact-a-watershed/ (emphasis mine)